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Abstract
This article investigates where financial participation is most likely to be encountered, 
and explores its compatibility with collective forms of employee voice. It is based 
on the findings of a major international survey of human resource management 
(HRM) practices.  We found that financial participation was not affected by collective 
employee voice, but that national context and associated HRM strategies had 
significant effects on its nature and extent.  As financial participation is likely to make 
for greater variation in wage rates, it tends to weaken industry-level bargaining. By 
re-casting the fundamental determinants of wages, it is also likely to facilitate greater 
wage dispersion within the firm. Hence, it was found that financial participation is 
more commonly encountered in liberal market contexts, and in firms practising 
calculative HRM, where countervailing employee power is weak, whether or not 
collective bargaining is formally present.
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Introduction
This article investigates where financial participation is most likely to be encountered, 
and explores its compatibility with collective forms of employee voice. It therefore seeks 
to shed further light on the nature of financial participation, and the extent to which it is 
compatible with (or indeed part and parcel of) more stakeholder-orientated ways of orga-
nizing work and employment. The article is based on the findings of a major interna-
tional survey of HR practices.
Historically, there have been three motives for employers and the state introducing 
broad-based financial participation schemes aimed at most employees, as opposed to 
narrowly based schemes aimed at managers. The first has been defensive, to defend 
capital’s legitimacy. A second set of motives seeks to involve workers in enterprises. 
Third, a more utopian motivation exists, intended to prefigure states of enhanced social 
harmony. The three motives are often difficult to distinguish, and have been pursued at 
different points by the state, employers and workers. These different motives mean that 
financial participation could be compatible with collective voice mechanisms, forming 
part and parcel of a broadly pluralist employment relations paradigm, or could represent 
a manifestation of neo-unitarist ‘hard’ HRM. In terms of context, financial participation 
may be encountered where shareholder rights are prominent, or, alternatively, represent 
one of the mechanisms whereby employee rights are entrenched in more stakeholder-
orientated national settings.
The differing motives, types and effects of financial 
participation: Existing research evidence
Employees’ productive behaviour is determined by the social definition of the situation 
that they adopt (Akerlof, 1982). Akerlof emphasizes the implicit gift–exchange nature of 
employment relations, whereby exchange is based on reciprocity and trust and relations are 
endogenously determined. Management has to try to influence these norms and may do 
so through financial participation (MacInnes et al., 1985). Thus, at the organizational 
level, financial participation may be a ‘carrot’ approach, rather than the ‘stick’ of monitor-
ing employees (McNabb and Whitfield, 1998: 173). More recently, the aim of enhancing 
control has been more prominent, through aligning employee interests more closely with 
that of the employer, rather than promoting a utopian future (Baddon et al., 1989; see 
Morris et al., 2005). As Pendleton (2006: 754) notes, agency theory has increasingly 
been used to analyse financial participation, bringing assumptions about ‘rational choice’ 
individualism that discount workplace solidarities. It is assumed that workers will police 
their peers to maximize individual returns from group performance (Gollan et al., 2006). 
The latter approaches have accompanied the rise of ‘harder’ or more instrumental 
approaches to HRM, with the intention of promoting individualism rather than collectivism 
(Storey, 2001). They therefore aim to move away from rigid employment contracts to a 
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more flexible arrangement, whereby employees can share both more risk and reward 
(Kato and Morishima, 2002).
In the case of profit related pay, employees gain either cash or dividends from profit 
linked pay or a deferred profit sharing system; in the case of employee share ownership 
schemes, employees receive shares in the firm (Kato and Morishima, 2002). Share owner-
ship can be built through firm or employee contributions (Poutsma and de Nijs, 2003). 
Some schemes combine elements of both (Cin et al., 2002). Profit sharing is linked to direct 
participation, in that it is an incentive to enhance immediate performance, while the latter 
gives employees a longer-term interest and, at least formally, a say in decision-making (Cin 
et al., 2002). McNabb and Whitfield (1998) suggest that these different types of scheme are 
not complementary in that they do not often seem to work well when encountered together. 
Both profit related pay and employee share ownership schemes may be operational-
ized in a sophisticated fashion, with shares or a cash handout (linked to organizational 
performance) being distributed to all employees (D’Art and Turner, 2004). These two 
types of financial participation differ in many respects: the former is really part of the 
immediate pay package, and part and parcel of the employment contract. The latter is not 
related to the employment contract, but rather to the ownership of the firm, and, indeed, 
it is rare for a share ownership scheme to be incorporated in the employment contract 
(Poutsma and de Nijs, 2003). In part, this may be on account of the difficulty of negotiat-
ing such arrangements in the case of centralized bargaining (where the latter is in place). 
It could reflect a lack of compatibility between centralized bargaining and financial par-
ticipation. However, Jones (1997) suggests that financial participation is more likely to 
succeed when workers have a greater degree of voice and control (see Ichniowski et al., 
1997). Similarly, Kato and Morishima (2002) found that, in the case of Japan, financial 
participation worked better when combined with other voice mechanisms.
Studies conducted in a wide range of contexts provide mixed results regarding perfor-
mance outcomes (D’Art and Turner, 2004; Nykodym et al., 1994; see also McNabb and 
Whitfield, 1998). Blasi et al. (1996) found no clear relation, although the balance tended 
towards more favourable results from employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), espe-
cially in the case of smaller firms. In contrast, Jones and Kato (1993) concluded that 
ESOPs enhanced productivity in Japan and suggested that they are more likely where the 
organization’s performance has recently been poor and where labour costs are low. Kato 
and Morishima (2002) found similar productivity benefits, though these tended to 
develop only over time. Looking at evidence from US ‘new economy’ firms, Sesil et al. 
(2002) found that those with stock option schemes tended to perform better. These mixed 
results may, in part, reflect the extent to which the fact of owning shares is far removed 
from the experience of day-to-day work and gains appear relatively arbitrary (see 
Nykodym et al., 1994). As Bakan et al. (2004) note, share ownership plans and similar 
forms of financial participation can be rather complicated, making understanding of their 
operation difficult for employees with limited formal education.
McNabb and Whitfield (1998) argue that the linkage between different types of 
participation is crucially important: bundles of practices may interact with each other and 
have a greater impact combined than each one in their own right. Pendleton (2006) sug-
gests that financial participation may be encountered where there are a large number of 
forms of employee involvement, including forms of voice.
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While often promoted as one element of ‘High Performance Work Systems’ (HPWS) 
and linked to other forms of participation (Appelbaum et al., 2000), financial participation 
is very different from other forms and indeed may be seen as an alternative to employee 
voice. Financial participation is both formal – in that employees gain shares in the company, 
and/or are formally allocated specific payments – and indirect – managers remain in 
control, and continue to make strategic decisions, even if workers have some formal rights 
as shareholders. Strauss (2006: 779) argues that the concept of ‘financial participation’ is 
a misnomer: financial schemes do not give workers a real voice in running firms. In most 
instances, the best workers can hope for in terms of influencing company policy under a 
share ownership scheme is via annual general meetings; in practice, this is unlikely to be 
successful, with drivers of shareholder activism commonly being external hostile raiders, 
for whom the interests of the target firm’s workforce are far from constituting a priority 
(Strauss, 2006). In the US, management frequently acts as the legal trustee of employees’ 
shares and can vote on their behalf at annual general meetings. 
Financial participation and collective voice
It has been argued that most studies show positive links between direct employee 
participation and financial participation (Conyon and Freeman, 2001), though this is 
controversial (Dell’Aringa et al., 2007). Results from research on the relation between 
financial and other forms of participation diverge. Such schemes may be used to head 
off union organizing drives, by giving employees an individual stake in the firm and 
undermining the basis of collectivism. Financial participation may represent a strat-
egy aimed at promoting consensus, with workers foregoing union representation for 
essentially paternalistic concessions (Gollan et al., 2006). Given this, unions are often 
hostile to such initiatives (D’Art and Turner, 2000). However, citing evidence from 
Ohio, Yates (2006) argues that outright employee share ownership does not threaten 
unionization. Black and Lynch (2004) argue that performance-based pay is often 
encountered with employee voice mechanisms: unionization may promote notions of 
job security, which may make employees more willing to support involvement and 
participation aimed at increasing output. In short, different participative mechanisms 
may be complementary (see Ichniowski et al., 1997). We have adopted this line in 
formulating our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Financial participation is more likely to be found in workplaces where collective 
bargaining, works councils and Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) are in place. 
Financial participation and calculative HRM
An alternative focus is on the extent to which key dimensions of calculative HRM 
(Gooderham et al., 1999, 2006) are associated with financial participation. Gooderham 
et al. (2006: 1500) coined the ‘calculative’ HRM term to reflect individually based 
appraisal and reward systems, and active monitoring of training’s effectiveness. This 
is counterposed to ‘collaborative’ HRM, whereby employees are seen and encour-
aged to see themselves as part of a collective enterprise. Evidence from the British 
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Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) suggests that firms offering share 
plans are also likely to make use of ‘calculative’ individual performance based pay 
(Pendleton, 2006: 772). Thus, incentives that are open to groups are combined with 
those operating at an individual level. Kochan and Osterman (1994) note that both 
bring greater flexibility in the price of labour, suggesting that financial participation 
may constitute part of a broader instrumentalist HRM strategy.
In sum, the question emerges as to how far financial participation may be found in 
organizations practising calculative HRM, and the degree to which financial participation 
may be a dimension of the latter.
Hypothesis 2: Financial participation is more likely to be encountered within organizations 
practising calculative HRM.
Financial participation and varieties of capitalism
The varieties of capitalism approach seek to explain firms’ behaviours in their national 
institutional contexts. Hall and Soskice (2001; see also Dore, 2000; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 
1990) argue that a key distinction is between liberal market economies (LMEs) such as 
the UK and the US, and the collaborative market economies (CMEs) of continental 
Europe. In LMEs, markets play a greater role, and shareholder rights are much stronger 
than those of other stakeholders, with less patient investor behaviour (Dore, 2000). 
Competition between firms is more adversarial, focusing strongly on immediate competi-
tive advantage (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2001). In contrast, within CMEs, large 
firms cooperate to a greater extent, underpinned by interlocking ownership structures, 
less reliance on stock market finance and more patient investor behaviour. A tendency 
towards coalition governments, and neo-corporatism, makes for stronger stakeholder, 
rather than shareholder, rights, including the rights of employees. It has been widely 
argued that the level and nature of participation will vary greatly between countries (e.g. 
Szabo, 2006), in line with the different varieties of capitalism. Within CMEs, employees 
are more likely to enjoy a combination of mutually reinforcing collective voice mecha-
nisms, underpinning cooperative and incrementally innovative production paradigms 
(Brewster et al., 2007). In contrast, in LMEs, employee voice mechanisms are likely to be 
much weaker and individually orientated. 
It can be argued that employee share ownership schemes are more likely to be 
encouraged by states in LMEs, where there is a strong emphasis on existing share-
holder rights and the generation of shareholder value. They are unlikely to strengthen 
employees’ traditionally weaker rights, with employee share ownership being very 
heavily diluted, and with limited voting rights (Poutsma and de Nijs, 2003). Profit 
sharing may, however, be brought under collective bargaining, with fixed formulae 
being agreed upon. Employee share ownership was more likely to be encountered in 
the UK, a LME, and in larger firms, as the latter are more likely to be publicly listed 
(see also Pendleton et al., 2003). Employee share ownership schemes may also be used 
as a defence against takeovers, as employees or trustees of employee share ownership 
plans are unlikely to sell their stakes to unknown bidders, or those with a negative 
reputation (Davidson and Worrell, 1994). Profit sharing is about greater flexibility in 
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pay rates (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). This is likely to be much harder to implement 
where collective bargaining is more widespread: the latter is likely to result in less 
flexibility in adjusting wages (especially downward) between rounds of collective 
bargaining (Hyman, 1989). 
Finally, differences in financial participation levels may reflect differences in public 
policy and in particular tax arrangements. Cin et al. (2002) note that financial participa-
tion became much more popular in the 1980s and 1990s. The European Union and 
European states have taken action to encourage financial participation in recent decades 
(McNabb and Whitfield, 2007). In the UK, government sought to promote employee 
share ownership in utility firms undergoing privatization, in order to promote support for 
the privatization and to make renationalization more difficult (Ogden, 1995).
Kalmi et al. (2005) found little link between national context and the extent of 
employee involvement in the design of such programmes. One explanation might be that 
the penetration of such schemes across continental Europe in recent years is an effort to 
disseminate HRM practices associated with LMEs (Kalmi et al., 2005; Lane, 2003).
Hypothesis 3: Financial participation is more likely to be encountered in LMEs.
Financial participation and firm type
Research also indicates a sectoral and workforce composition dimension: Robinson 
and Wilkinson (2006) found that profit sharing is more likely in unskilled and uncer-
tain business environments. In contrast, employee share ownership schemes are more 
likely in more skilled and less pressurized working environments (see also Morris 
et al., 2005). Poutsma and de Nijs (2003) found that profit sharing is more likely in 
growing European firms with skilled workforces. Where employee performance is 
hard to measure, it is argued that financial participation is more likely (Pendleton, 
2006). Finally, Jones and Kato (1996) found that poorly performing firms were more 
likely to experiment with ESOPs: this would suggest that it might be more likely that 
they would be encountered in declining industries. In short, the nature and extent of 
financial participation may also reflect sectoral and other organizational characteris-
tics (Whitfield and Poole, 1996). The free rider issue may make financial participa-
tion more viable in smaller firms where it is easier to identify shirkers, and Blasi et al. 
(1996) found that ESOPs yield better results in smaller firms, making their implemen-
tation more attractive.
Hypothesis 4: The incidence of financial participation is likely to vary according to sector 
within specific national contexts, and the size of the firm: financial participation is more likely 
to be encountered in smaller firms and in sunset industries.
Financial participation and the legal system
Financial researchers have also explored institutional effects (La Porta et al., 1998, 
2000), citing the extent to which property rights are protected within different national 
institutional frameworks (Djankov et al., 2003). La Porta et al. have constructed a scale 
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of legal systems, ranking them as to whether they are closer to common law or civil law 
ideal types (see La Porta et al., 1998, 2000; also Djankov et al., 2003). The legal system 
will affect how other markets are regulated: they assume a zero-sum relation between 
shareholder and stakeholder rights and, should the one be protected, the other will neces-
sarily be undermined (see Botero et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2003). In common law 
countries, shareholder rights are likely to be stronger, and in civil law ones weaker; the 
converse is true with employee rights. 
It may therefore be more likely that financial participation will be encountered where 
owner rights are stronger, that is, in countries closer to the common law ideal (see Botero 
et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2003).
Hypothesis 5: The incidence of financial participation is likely to vary according to the type and 
extent of employment laws present in each specific country: it is more likely to be found in 
countries closer to the common law ideal, and less likely in civil law ones.
Data and method
The data used here are taken from the Cranet survey, containing evidence on human 
resource management and industrial relations within private and public organizations in 
22 European countries (Brewster et al., 2004). We only use data from the private sector, 
taking results from the most recent, 2003/4 survey in five countries identified as exam-
ples of liberal market and co-ordinated market economies. The UK is used as a liberal 
market economy and Germany, Austria, Sweden and Denmark are used as appropriate 
examples of co-ordinated market economies. The survey is an international one of 
HR managers covering, in all, 41 countries from Western Europe and Eastern Europe. 
Developed countries such as the USA, Japan and Australia as well as transitional econo-
mies are encompassed by the survey. The survey is answered by the most senior HR 
professional, and covers a wide range of matters relating to company policies and prac-
tices in the HR area. Full technical details of the survey are provided by Brewster et al. 
(2004). The data for each country are representative with respect to size of industrial sec-
tors by numbers employed. Firms are selected randomly, but weighted for sector and size 
to reflect the dynamics of the wider population, from publicly available mailing lists. 
There are three major limits to the survey. First, it excludes smaller firms, that is, those 
with fewer than 100 employees: on the other hand, such firms are less likely to have 
sophisticated HR systems in place. Second, it relies mostly on closed-ended questions to 
preclude prevarication and/or ambiguous responses; this means that some of the richness 
of specific contexts may be lost. Third, it is likely that potential respondents who took 
their role and function most seriously would be most likely to reply, which may reflect, 
at least partially the importance firms assign to the HR function; hence, firms that do not 
take HR seriously may be under-represented in the findings. However, consecutive 
Cranet surveys have consistently identified key clusters of practices and continuities, in 
relation both to sectors and nations, confirming their utility.
The first issue is how best to measure the organization’s commitment to financial par-
ticipation when it can take place through a number of methods, as well as at a number of 
levels. A scale is constructed using a series of dichotomous variables reflecting 
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the presence of different types of financial participation and the level at which they are 
available. These variables are: does the firm make use of employee share schemes, stock 
options and profit sharing separately for management, professional staff, clerical workers 
and manual workers. The scale is then constructed using Mokken’s non-parametric model 
for one dimensional cumulative scaling (Sjitsma and Molenaar, 2002). This generates a 
scale ranging from 100 for those organizations recording ‘yes’ for all 12 items, zero for 
those recording all ‘no’ answers and an intermediate position for the majority of firms with 
a combination of yes and no responses. Their relative position in the scale is determined by 
their number of positive responses and the relative scarcity of positive responses to each of 
those survey questions. Therefore, a positive response to those questions having fewer 
‘yes’ answers (e.g. aspects of financial participation that are less common, such as items 10, 
11 and 12 in Table 1), will have a larger impact upon the scale than the more common posi-
tive responses. The financial participation scale is then used as the dependent variable 
within an empirical model where the extent of financial participation is regressed, using 
ordinary least squares, upon those variables highlighted within the hypotheses as being 
likely to promote or discourage the presence of financial participation within the organiza-
tion. In addition, to explore the possibility that the factors influencing the presence of the 
three types of financial participation are different, the scale is disaggregated into its share 
ownership, profit sharing and stock option components respectively, with each of these 
being used as the dependent variable and regressed on the same explanatory variables.
The financial participation scale is estimated as a function of employee relations, the 
extent of calculative HRM, the variety of capitalism, and size and sector. Dummy vari-
ables are added for those firms where a JCC or works council is present as well as for 
those with collective bargaining over pay above the establishment level, thus enabling 
Hypothesis 1 to be tested with both of these expected to have a positive impact. Second, 
a scale is included reflecting the extent of calculative HRM within the organization. This 
is again a Mokken scale of the same type as the dependent variable and replicates as far 
as possible the scale developed by Gooderham et al. (1999) reflecting the presence of 
formal appraisals and/or merit pay for management, professionals, clerical staff and 
manual workers respectively. This relates to Hypothesis 2, the prediction being that there 
should be a positive relation between the extent of calculative HRM and the presence of 
financial participation. To facilitate testing Hypothesis 3, a dummy variable is created 
identifying those firms within the coordinated market economies. The UK is the base 
group and the CME dummy is expected to be negatively correlated with financial partici-
pation. Firm size is measured by the total number of employees in the organization and 
sector is controlled for using a set of 16 industry dummies. Metal manufacturing is used 
as the reference category. Both of these groups relate to Hypothesis 4. In addition, the 
possibility that the relation between the explanatory and dependent variables is not the 
same across all of the countries is controlled for by including interaction terms that 
reflect the interactions between firm size and variety of capitalism as well as calculative 
HRM and VOC.
Finally, the countries are reconfigured to reflect the legal system rather than the 
variety of capitalism. The UK remains the base group as it lies in the lower region of 
Botero et al.’s (2004) employment law index. There is a dummy identifying the mid-
range countries (Denmark and Austria) as well as one for the upper range countries 
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(Germany and Sweden). The model is then re-estimated using the reconfigured country 
dummies, thus enabling Hypothesis 5 to be tested.
Although not presented as a formal hypothesis we speculate that the factors influenc-
ing the presence of financial participation may differ across different levels of the orga-
nization. In short, the factors determining the presence of profit sharing, share ownership 
or stock options for management and professionals may be more or less important when 
considering the availability of these schemes to manual or clerical workers. Therefore, 
dichotomous variables are created reflecting the presence of broad based financial par-
ticipation, these being firms offering profit sharing, share ownership or stock options 
respectively to manual and/or clerical workers against those who do not. The resultant 
binary variables are then used as the dependent variables and estimated against the same 
explanatory variables, but on this occasion logit models are used, rather than OLS, as 
there is a limited dependent variable.
Findings
The first stage of the analysis is to construct the Mokken scale of financial participation, 
designed to incorporate the broadest possible measure of all types of financial participa-
tion; the results are recorded in Table 1. Before proceeding it is important to establish the 
validity of the scale as a measure of financial participation, entailing an examination of 
both the scalability and reliability of both the data and the resultant scale. The first test of 
the validity of the scale is Loevinger’s H-coefficient of homogeneity (H
wgt
), which is 
recorded for each individual item as well as for the overall scale. The minimum accep-
tance criterion is an H-value of at least 0.3. All of the individual items satisfy this and the 
H-value for the overall scale of 0.36 indicates that the scale is robust in terms of scal-
ability. It is also important to test for the indicators’ reliability: the Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.79 is comfortably above the standard minimum of 0.7. The same process is carried out 
for the calculative HRM scale used as an explanatory variable in the empirical model; 
this also satisfies both conditions (full results are available from the authors on request). 
As the financial participation scale satisfies the key conditions in terms of scalability and 
reliability it can be used as the dependent variable within the empirical model. This is 
estimated using ordinary least squares and the results are reported in Table 3, together 
with the subsequent models where the dependent variable is each of the three elements 
disaggregated from the overall financial participation index. However, before examining 
the results of the various empirical analyses in detail the descriptive statistics for all of 
the variables used in the analysis are recorded below in Table 2.
Even for cross-sectional data the R-squared is low, as only 11 percent of the variation 
in the financial participation scale is explained by the independent variables. It is there-
fore fair to assume that factors beyond the scope of this model have an influence upon 
the decision to make use of financial participation.
The first hypothesis predicts that financial participation will be more likely in the 
presence of collective bargaining and a JCC or works council and this hypothesis is 
largely rejected. Collective bargaining is irrelevant to the presence of financial participa-
tion as it is insignificant in all four models. However, the situation with JCCs/works 
councils is less clear cut: in the first model, combining all aspects of financial 
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participation, the presence of a JCC/works council does not have a significant impact. 
Only in the case of profit sharing is there evidence of a positive and significant impact 
from a JCC/works council upon the extent of financial participation. It is even revealed 
that the presence of a JCC/works council significantly reduces the extent of stock options, 
possibly suggesting that these formal representative bodies have a preference for profit 
sharing over stock option schemes.
The second hypothesis relates to the relation between calculative HRM and financial 
participation, with the expectation that those firms more extensively practising calcula-
tive HRM are more likely to make use of financial participation. This is strongly con-
firmed by the empirical analysis. The calculative scale is positive and significant in all 
cases, with the level of significance only dropping for profit sharing. This suggests 
that financial participation underpins and supports the strategies of those firms pursuing 
calculative HRM.
The third formal hypothesis proposes that the extent of financial participation is likely 
to be higher within LMEs. The evidence from the model provides some support for this. 
The CME dummy variable is negative and strongly significant in the overall financial 
participation model indicating that once size, industry, employee relations and calcula-
tive HRM are controlled for, the extent of financial participation as measured by this 
scale is significantly lower within the firms located in CMEs. However, once the scale is 
separated into its three components it is shown that this is very clearly true for share 
ownership, but there is no significant difference between LMEs and CMEs for other 
forms of financial participation. As a result, Hypothesis 3 is partially confirmed, but only 
in the case of share ownership.
The prediction of Hypothesis 4 is that the extent of financial participation will be 
affected by size and sector. The size variable is positive and significant in all four models, 
indicating that the greater the number of employees, the more willing and able firms are 
to make use of financial participation. This is at odds with what was posited by Hypothesis 
Table 1 Mokken scale of financial participation
  Mean H
wgt 
Corr.
Scale Overall calculative scale, 12 items  0.36 0.33
 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79)
Item 1 Employee share scheme – management 0.27 0.38 0.52
Item 2 Employee share scheme – professional 0.21 0.39 0.55
Item 3 Employee share scheme – clerical 0.19 0.40 0.56
Item 4 Employee share scheme – manual 0.16 0.34 0.44
Item 5 Profit sharing – management 0.37 0.36 0.39
Item 6 Profit sharing – professional 0.28 0.36 0.48
Item 7 Profit sharing – clerical 0.23 0.35 0.49
Item 8 Profit sharing – manual 0.17 0.33 0.43
Item 9 Stock options – management 0.23 0.30 0.39
Item 10 Stock options – professional 0.09 0.36 0.36
Item 11 Stock options – clerical 0.05 0.36 0.27
Item 12 Stock options – manual 0.03 0.39 0.22
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4 as it was anticipated that there would be a negative relation between size and financial 
participation. However, for sector the evidence is less clear cut. In comparison with the 
metal manufacturing reference category only energy and water have significantly higher 
levels of financial participation. The latter sectors encompass privatized state utilities: as 
noted above, in the UK, financial participation has been used to make privatization more 
palatable (see Ogden, 1995). A handful of industries, notably education, have signifi-
cantly lower levels, and the majority of industries do not differ greatly from the base 
group. Hypothesis 4 is therefore only partially upheld.
It was also posited that cross-country differences may reflect specific types of legal 
system, hence the original model was re-estimated with a reconfiguration of the country 
variables to reflect differences in the legal systems. As outlined earlier, the UK is the 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
Financial participation scale 18.023 20.07 0 100 1640
Share ownership scale 20.964 36.19 0 100 1640
Profit sharing scale 25.897 37.87 0 100 1640
Stock option scale 8.981 20.40 0 100 1640
Broad based share ownership 0.218 0.41 0 1 1640
Broad based profit sharing 0.245 0.43 0 1 1640
Broad based stock option 0.047 0.21 0 1 1640
Total no. of employees (000s) 1982.538 10709.31 6 211063 1640
Agriculture 0.010 0.10 0 1 1640
Energy & water 0.026 0.16 0 1 1640
Chemical products 0.038 0.19 0 1 1640
Metal manufacturing 0.222 0.42 0 1 1640
Other manufacturing 0.207 0.41 0 1 1640
Building & civil engineering 0.038 0.19 0 1 1640
Retail & distribution 0.117 0.32 0 1 1640
Transport & communication 0.052 0.22 0 1 1640
Banking, finance & insurance 0.123 0.33 0 1 1640
Personal & domestic services 0.009 0.09 0 1 1640
Health services 0.018 0.13 0 1 1640
Other services 0.023 0.15 0 1 1640
Education 0.007 0.08 0 1 1640
Social services 0.003 0.06 0 1 1640
Public administration 0.019 0.14 0 1 1640
Other 0.088 0.28 0 1 1640
Coordinated market economy 0.570 0.50 0 1 1640
Liberal market economy 0.430 0.50 0 1 1640
JCC/WC present 0.666 0.47 0 1 1640
Collective bargaining 0.741 0.44 0 1 1640
Calculative HRM scale 39.395 28.36 0 100 1640
Size * VOC 906.646 6009.98 0 210000 1640
Calculative HRM * VOC 21.937 29.41 0 100 1640
Denmark, Austria 0.288 0.45 0 1 1640
Germany, Sweden 0.282 0.45 0 1 1640
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reference category being in the lower third of the employment law index, Denmark and 
Austria are in the medium range and Germany and Sweden are in the upper third. 
Although in the interests of brevity the results are not reported here, they are available on 
request. Both of the legal system dummies are negative and significant, suggesting that 
none of the legal systems are as conducive to financial participation as that in the UK, a 
country close to the common law ideal type. However, it may have been expected that 
the level of financial participation decreased as the employment law index increased (i.e. 
coming closer to the civil law ideal), but that is not the case as the countries in the middle 
range are the least likely to make use of financial participation. It would appear that the 
relation between financial participation and the legal system is more subtle and nuanced 
than a straightforward linear one. The relation between employer and employee rights is 
not a simple dichotomous one, as suggested by Botero et al. (2004). Hypothesis 5 is 
therefore disproved: the relation between legal system, employee rights and financial 
participation appears to be rather more complex than would be suggested in the litera-
ture: this area deserves further investigation.
Finally, logit models are estimated using those firms adopting broad based financial 
participation and those not as the dependent variables. The results are recorded in Table 
4 with the findings largely confirming those reported earlier. However, it is noticeable 
that calculative HRM has a much smaller impact upon broad based financial participa-
tion, particularly profit sharing. It is fairly easy to reach a similar conclusion for stock 
option schemes as the low proportion of firms offering broad based stock options, only 
4.7 percent, renders virtually all of the explanatory variables insignificant. It is also inter-
esting to note, although the causes are not clear, that the interactions between both size 
and variety of capitalism as well as calculative HRM and VOC are more important than 
in the earlier models.
Conclusion
The article contributes to understanding the relation between different forms of voice 
mechanism and types of financial participation. Perhaps the most striking finding is the 
lack of relation between both profit sharing or share ownership schemes and collective 
bargaining. This confirms the value of taking an approach that is more compatible with 
a ‘management choice’ philosophy than with a ‘constrained choice’ one. Indeed, the 
extent of managerial choice may well underlie the small amount of variation in financial 
participation explained by the independent variables. Thus, even in larger firms where 
financial participation is most in evidence and unions tend to have a relatively strong 
presence, the presence of financial participation is not the result of pressure from trade 
unions. This no doubt reflects the often hostile or agnostic stances taken by European 
unions to financial participation schemes in general. Why then, is there not a strongly 
negative relation? This could reflect union weakness, that the issue is not central to their 
agenda, or a combination of the two (see Hyman, 1989). 
The managerial choice notion is supported by the relation we demonstrate between 
different forms of financial participation on the one hand, and calculative HRM 
and variety of capitalism on the other. Those firms adopting calculative HRM are 
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significantly more likely to make use of financial participation to underpin and sup-
port company strategies. The calculative scale is largely a measure of the individual-
ization of employment arrangements and, as such, the link to individualized financial 
participation is not surprising. Financial participation allows for greater variation in 
wage setting within and between firms particularly, as we have shown, in the case of 
profit sharing, depending on differences in organizational performance, and arrange-
ments regarding how profits are shared out. Where financial participation is avail-
able in CME firms, it tends to be made available at all levels. It should be recalled 
that the wage gap between managerial and non-managerial pay remains much greater 
in LMEs, and that the manner in which financial participation is operationalized may 
be worsening this inequality. Firms in the LMEs are more likely to seek efficiency 
gains by extending the calculative paradigm both ideologically and sociologically. 
While there appeared to be differences in the extent of financial participation depend-
ing on national legal systems, the relation appeared a complex one: the incidence 
was not automatically lower in countries closer to the civil law ideal than those that 
were less so.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the latter point suggests that the ‘calculative HRM’ 
concept may usefully be extended to include financial participation. Indeed, financial 
participation appears an entirely rational crystallization of the implications of the para-
digm as formulated by Gooderham et al. As in some companies ‘calculative’ practices 
are followed without financial participation, a distinction between the standard form and 
an ‘extended calculative’ form may be useful. In the latter case, the appraisal and mea-
surement approach evident in calculative HRM may appear to managements to be under-
pinned and reinforced by financial participation. The bundle of practices is therefore 
expanded and may appear more coherent both to managers and employees.
In CMEs, on the other hand, many companies appear to be combining historic col-
lectivism with some performance-enhancing features of firms in LMEs. While they use 
profit sharing across more employee strata, this is not the case with financial participa-
tion more widely defined and, as a result, they tie employees more directly to companies’ 
announced profits. Employees are therefore more exposed to company accounting prac-
tice risks than to broader stock market risk. While there may be some scope for their 
exercising voice over the first via company mechanisms, there is no such possibility in 
relation to the second. Thus, the predominant choice in the form of financial participation 
is, as in the case of the ‘calculative’ HRM forms most commonly found in LMEs, con-
sistent with other forms of participation that promote employee voice in CMEs. A fertile 
area for future research would be the extent to which foreign-owned multinationals may 
be pioneering financial participation as part and parcel of broader strategies to promote 
shareholder rights and weaken those of employees, while influencing the allocation of 
resources between these two groupings. It also highlights once again the nature of diver-
sity within national contexts, and the degree to which variations in managerial strategy 
and, potentially, in countervailing employee voice may open up opportunities for employ-
ers to experiment with more hard line approaches. 
Our analysis underlines the importance of size and sector to the incidence of financial 
participation. Larger firms were more likely to experiment with financial participation. 
This could reflect both the extent to which larger firms are subject to international 
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pressures towards liberalization: it may also reflect the greater likelihood that such firms 
may be foreign owned, and in a coordinated market setting, infusing aspects of the HRM 
model encountered in their parent country (see Brewster et al., 2008). In sector terms, 
virtually all of the dummies achieve significance in the profit sharing model, suggesting 
that the presence of profit sharing is more sensitive than share ownership to the firm’s 
sector. This could reflect the extent to which profit sharing may be more closely associ-
ated with specific production paradigms, operating as potentially a more sophisticated 
development of traditional output-based pay. 
In summary, we found that financial participation was not affected by collective 
employee voice, but that national context and associated HRM strategies had significant 
effects on its nature and extent. Given that financial participation is likely to make for 
greater variation in wage rates, it is also likely to weaken any industry-level bargaining: 
by re-casting the fundamental determinants of wages, it is also likely to facilitate greater 
wage dispersion within the firm. Hence, it was found that financial participation was 
more commonly encountered in liberal market contexts, and in firms practising calcula-
tive HRM, where countervailing employee power is weak, whether or not collective 
bargaining is formally present. While the legal system appears to have some impact, the 
relation is not a linear one, framed purely by how close or far countries are from a com-
mon law ideal type. Sector and firm size also impacted on the nature and extent of finan-
cial participation, which could reflect industry-specific variations in bargaining practices, 
differences in production paradigms, and, in the case of size, the possible effects of 
foreign ownership.
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